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Perspectives on the
Household Saving Rate
IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 1998, the personal saving rate as measured
in the national income and product accounts (NIPAs) dipped below zero
for the first time since the Great Depression. For the entire year, personal
saving totaled just 0.5 percent of personal disposable income, the lowest
rate since 1933. And in the advance estimate for the first quarter of 1999,
the personal saving rate fell to –0.5 percent. These results are just the lat-
est steps in the decline of the NIPA personal saving rate, which, after
averaging 7.6 percent in the 1960s, 8.2 percent in the 1970s, 6.7 percent
in the 1980s, and 4.8 percent in 1990–94, fell to 3.0 percent in 1996 and
2.2 percent in 1997. Although both academic publications and the popu-
lar press have repeatedly warned of a saving crisis over the last twenty
years, the virtual disappearance of personal saving since 1998 has brought
the issue back into the limelight.
At least three different views of the decline in personal saving have
been aired. One group, with a focus on long-term growth, views the low
saving rate as bad news and worries that saving will stay low. Holders of
this view believe that low saving rates signify dangerously low levels of
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Institute on Aging.on ﬁckle foreign capital; at a micro level, it raises fears that households are
not saving enough for retirement or other purposes.
A second group, focused on sustaining short-term aggregate demand,
sees significant good news in the low saving rate and worries that saving
will rebound. Adherents of this view argue that the decline in personal sav-
ing and the accompanying rise in consumption have helped fuel the eco-
nomic expansion in the United States and helped prop up the global econ-
omy. They worry that households are now stretched thin and will soon
retrench, driving the U.S. and global economies into a tailspin.
The third view is perhaps best summarized by William Nordhaus: “Our
tools for measuring saving and investment are stone-age deﬁnitions in the
information age.”
1 This view is rooted in the observations that standard
measures of aggregate saving correspond weakly at best to the concepts
of saving that drive economic models and analysis, that empirical mea-
sures of saving are inherently elusive and often arbitrary, and that coming
to grips with different economic issues may require the examination of dif-
ferent measures of saving. This view does not rule out the hypothesis that
saving is too low or that a consumption binge is propping up the econ-
omy, but holders of this view would be unlikely to draw these—or any
other—conclusions on the basis of ofﬁcial saving aggregates alone.
In this paper we reexamine secular and recent trends in saving in a spirit
consistent with the third view. Our central goal is to delineate several alter-
native conceptual measures of saving and present evidence on how each
has evolved over time. We do not attempt to determine the causes or the
consequences of the saving decline; indeed, some of our measures sug-
gest that saving is rising rather than falling.
2
We begin by examining the various ways in which saving can be
defined and noting that saving measures can vary in scope and in level of
aggregation. We highlight the point that different concepts and measures of
saving may be most relevant for answering different questions. Under-
standing how each of various saving measures has evolved can inform
numerous aspects of policy and research. Indeed, it is difﬁcult to see how
relevant conclusions about saving can be reached without a detailed under-
standing of these issues.
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1. Nordhaus (1995).
2. For analyses of the determinants of recent trends in saving behavior, see Parker
(1999), the citations therein, the comments on that paper by Laibson and Lusardi, and
Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991).Next we examine the standard measures of saving stemming from the
NIPAs. To obtain measures that correspond more closely to economic con-
cepts of saving, we alter the treatment of durable goods, inflation, retire-
ment accounts, and tax accruals. We also show that the distinctions
between personal and corporate saving are thin and somewhat arbitrary,
and thus we tend to focus on total private (personal plus corporate) sav-
ing. We ﬁnd that the adjusted measures of personal and private saving are
signiﬁcantly higher than the ofﬁcial data and have fallen by a much smaller
amount over the last two to three decades. We also note an increase in gov-
ernment saving that offsets the decline in personal saving.
We then turn to data from the national balance sheets that are part of the
flow of funds accounts (FFAs). This data source also shows a decline in
saving over time, due primarily to a reduction in net acquisition of non-
tax-preferred financial assets. Acquisitions of tax-preferred financial
assets, household accumulations of durable goods, and trends in borrow-
ing have remained roughly constant in recent years.
To provide another perspective, we augment the FFA measures of
household saving with data on real capital gains. We show that, over the
past forty years, capital gains have dominated measured saving as a source
of household wealth accumulation, and that, if all capital gains are
included as saving, the household saving rate is at its highest level in the
past forty years, not its lowest. We discuss but do not resolve whether and
under what circumstances it is appropriate to include capital gains in mea-
sures of saving.
We conclude by noting other items that could be added to saving rates,
including human capital, research and development, and other intangible
capital. Thus we make no claim to having captured “the” saving rate.
Rather, we conclude that different measures of saving can provide differ-
ent but complementary perspectives on the evolution of the economy and
that an understanding of these perspectives is a crucial input to any broader
interpretation of the causes or consequences of trends in saving behavior.
What Is Saving?
Generally, saving may be thought of as resources created or outputs
produced in the current period that are not consumed in the current period
but rather are made available for future consumption. With this idea in
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the change in wealth, or the supply of capital. Given comprehensive and
consistent definitions of each of these terms, each definition of saving
would represent the same concept and give rise to similar empirical mea-
sures. Empirically, however, several important issues arise.
First, even if one approach to defining saving—for example, income
less consumption—is accepted to the exclusion of others, these terms, too,
can be defined in different ways. For example, Nordhaus traces two his-
torical deﬁnitions of income.
3 Hicksian income is based on production and
measures the maximum amount of resources that could be consumed in
the current period while leaving the net capital stock intact. Fisherian
income is the equivalent of a consumption annuity and measures the max-
imum amount of resources that could be consumed in the current period
while still allowing for at least as much consumption in each successive
period. Although Weitzman shows special circumstances under which
these measures are equivalent,
4 Nordhaus shows that in general they will
differ, and empirically they differ significantly.
5 As a result, measures of
saving out of Hicksian income (that is, Hicksian income less consumption)
are empirically quite different from measures of saving out of Fisherian
income.
Second, saving measures can differ in scope. A narrow measure of
saving, often used in microeconomic studies of households, focuses on
flows of financial assets and debt. A very broad measure of saving would
focus on changes in the stock and value of financial, physical, intangible,
human, public, natural, and environmental capital.
6 Each alternative mea-
sure of the scope of saving implies alternative measures of income, capi-
tal, wealth, and so on. Likewise, each alternative deﬁnition of wealth, or of
income and consumption, implicitly defines an associated measure of
saving.
Saving can be measured in real or nominal terms and either gross or
net of depreciation. For most economic purposes, however, it is undoubt-
edly most appropriate to measure saving in real terms and net of depreci-
ation. Saving measures can also vary by level of aggregation across indi-
viduals, businesses, and governments.




6. Eisner (1988) surveys broad measures of saving that various authors have employed.Which measure of saving is most appropriate to employ may well
depend on why the data are being examined in the first place. To under-
stand how well households are preparing for retirement, for example, it
would be logical to focus on personal wealth measures, including social
security and medicare benefits. In contrast, if the goal is to examine gov-
ernment policies that encourage saving for retirement, it would be logical
to include their effects on government saving as well as on private saving,
since policy that raised private saving but reduced government saving by
more might not be considered effective.
Alternatively, if the goal is to understand the share of aggregate pro-
duction that society is devoting to investment in future production, it
makes sense to include not only saving as conventionally measured but
also investment in human capital, research and development, and other
forms of intangible capital. Whether capital gains should be included in the
calculation is controversial and may well depend on the source of the gain,
as discussed below.
These observations do not point to a unique, well-defined measure of
saving. But they do suggest links between various economic concepts and
appropriate measures of saving and the importance of closely examining
the measure and concept used. 
Saving in the National Income and Product Accounts
The NIPAs are designed to measure current production, the income
arising from that production, and the allocation of income across the
household, corporate, and government sectors. NIPA saving measures are
devised as part of this broader framework and therefore may not corre-
spond well with concepts and measures of saving in economic models.
Personal Saving
NIPA personal saving is meant to represent the portion of current pro-
duction made available by the household sector for the purchase of new
capital.
7 The household sector includes individuals and families, pension
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7. For further discussion of saving in the NIPAs, see Antoniewicz and Engen (1994),
Auerbach (1985), Boskin (1986), Bradford (1990, 1991), Ruggles and Ruggles (1983), Rug-
gles (1993), and Holloway (1989). The Bureau of Economic Analysis has been very respon-funds, life insurance, trust funds, not-for-profit organizations, and un-
incorporated businesses.
Formally, NIPA personal saving is measured as the difference between
personal disposable income and personal consumption outlays. Personal
disposable income is simply personal income less tax and nontax payments
by the household sector to governments. Personal income is deﬁned as the
sum of wage and salary disbursements, other labor income, net propri-
etor’s income from unincorporated businesses, net rental income, personal
interest and dividend income, and transfer payments, less personal contri-
butions for social insurance (social security and medicare). The vast bulk of
personal consumption outlays consists of expenditures on durables, non-
durables, and services. Interest paid by consumers to businesses and net
personal transfer payments to foreigners are also included in outlays.
Several features of the NIPA personal saving data are worth noting.
First, accrued and realized capital gains are excluded. A realized gain is
simply an exchange of one asset for another, and an accruing gain,
although it reﬂects an increase in the purchasing power of the asset holder,
is not considered to raise current production in the NIPA framework.
Second, all contributions to and interest and dividend earnings on pri-
vate pensions and 401(k) plans are included in NIPA personal saving.
Employee contributions to pensions and 401(k)s are included as part of
wage and salary disbursements. Employer contributions are counted as
part of other labor income, as are the interest and dividend earnings (less
expenses) of pension and 401(k) plans. To avoid double counting, pay-
ments of pension benefits are not included as income. Individual retire-
ment accounts (IRAs) and Keogh accounts are treated similarly: contri-
butions and interest and dividend earnings represent personal saving, but
withdrawals do not count as personal income.
The treatment of pensions creates an important difference between
households’view of their own wealth accumulation and recorded NIPA
saving. For workers enrolled in deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans, the time pat-
tern of beneﬁt accruals may be quite different from the patterns of contri-
butions and investment earnings. To take an extreme example, a worker
who takes a job at age 30 and is immediately vested in a pension plan that
pays a real beneﬁt of $50,000 per year upon turning 65 accumulates a large
186 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1999
sive to past commentary about how investment is measured and how saving is allocated
across sectors in the NIPAs (see Holloway, 1989; Larkins, 1999).amount of pension wealth upon starting the job. The recorded NIPA sav-
ing, however—the employer and employee contributions and the interest
and dividend earnings—will generally occur much later.
This is not to say that the NIPA method of recording pension saving is
inappropriate. The enrolling of the worker in the pension plan generates no
net pension saving—it merely creates a future pension asset for the worker
that is exactly offset by a pension liability for the firm. Accordingly, the
NIPAs record no saving as a result of the worker enrolling in the plan, even
though the worker sees a large increase in pension wealth. The net saving
occurs when the pension is funded by contributions and when the pension
balance grows with interest and dividends. These actions pay down the
pension liability but do not affect the pension benefit. Accordingly, these
items are recorded in NIPA saving.
8
Third, the NIPAs treat public pension and insurance funds in exactly the
opposite manner from private funds. Contributions and earnings of federal,
state, and local government pension and insurance funds are not treated
as personal saving, and so the benefit payments from those funds are
treated as income when received. Likewise, social security contributions
are not counted in personal saving (they are subtracted as part of personal
tax and nontax payments), and so social security benefits are counted as
personal income (speciﬁcally, as transfer payments).
Fourth, the NIPAs treat consumer durables and owner-occupied housing
differently, even though both are physical assets and both provide a stream
of consumption beneﬁts in the future. Spending on owner-occupied hous-
ing is considered saving: the net imputed rental income is included in the
rental income component of personal income, and the imputed space rental
is included in the services component of consumption expenditures. In
contrast, purchases of other consumer durables count as current consump-
tion outlays.
Fifth, the NIPA saving measure includes nominal interest receipts as
income and nominal interest payments as outlays. However, in the pres-
ence of inﬂation, only the real component of interest ﬂows should count as
income or outlays. Thus, for example, if a corporation pays a household
$100 in nominal interest, and the inﬂation rate and the real interest rate are
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8. One effect of pensions is not recorded in NIPA saving: the unfunded liability that is
created when the pension is created should reduce corporate equity values. But since the
NIPA saving measure does not include capital gains, this effect is not included.equal, real household sector income and saving are overstated by $50 and
real corporate income and saving are understated by $50.
Sixth, saving in the form of pensions has an implicit tax liability asso-
ciated with it.
9 For example, a household that makes a $100 tax-deductible
contribution to a pension and is permanently in a 20 percent tax bracket
should be conceived as having saved only $80. The remaining $20 is
deferred taxes—it represents neither reduced current consumption nor
increased future consumption for the household. A similar proportion of
interest and dividend earnings on pensions should not be construed as
personal saving. NIPA personal saving measures, however, include not
only the entire contribution but also interest and dividend earnings on pri-
vate pensions.
Corporate Saving
Corporate saving in the NIPAs is the undistributed profits of corpora-
tions (that is, after-tax proﬁts less dividends paid to shareholders) plus an
inventory valuation adjustment applied to the book value of inventories
and a capital consumption adjustment applied to the book value of plant
and equipment. These adjustments conform the undistributed proﬁts mea-
sure to the replacement cost concept that underlies the NIPAs. Like per-
sonal saving, NIPA corporate saving does not adjust interest flows for
inﬂation. We refer to corporate saving as corporate retained earnings, and
to private saving as the sum of corporate and personal saving.
From the perspective of economic theory, the line between personal and
corporate saving is thin and somewhat arbitrary. Regardless of whether
individuals effectively “pierce the corporate veil,”
10 the distinctions that
the NIPAs make between personal and corporate saving do not appear to
be the most relevant or appropriate for most economic models or analy-
ses of saving. For example, Poterba notes that both corporate dividend
payments and corporate share repurchases involve shifting funds from
the corporate to the household sector, but they have different effects on
sectoral saving in the NIPAs. Capital gains included as part of mutual fund
distributions used to be part of personal income, although gains in gen-
eral are not counted. A few years ago, however, such gains were reclassi-
fied as corporate income. The associated revisions increased corporate
188 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1999
9. Auerbach (1985); Bradford (1991); Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996).
10. See Poterba (1987) for more discussion and citations.saving and reduced personal saving but left private saving unchanged.
Likewise, the incorporation of Goldman Sachs earlier this year will shift
saving from the household sector to corporations.
Trends in NIPA Saving Measures
Table 1 shows NIPA net domestic investment and sources of funds for
investment across economic sectors for various subperiods over the last
forty years. Focusing ﬁrst on the 1990s, personal saving fell from 3.5 per-
cent of GDP in the early 1990s to 0.4 percent by 1998. However, the table
also shows that net private investment increased during the 1990s, from 5.3
percent of GDP in 1990–94 to 8.2 percent in 1998. That is, the decline in
measured personal saving was more than offset by increased saving in
other sectors. Total government saving rose from –2.0 percent of GDP in
1990–94 to 2.7 percent in 1998. Over the same period, corporate retained
earnings rose by 1.2 percent of GDP and net foreign saving by 1.5 per-
cent of GDP.
Taking a longer view, net investment was about 2 percent of GDP lower
in 1997–98 than in the 1960s and 1970s. Measured government saving and
corporate retained earnings were about the same share of GDP in the late
1990s as they were in the 1960s, but personal saving has fallen by about
5 percent of GDP, while net foreign saving has increased by almost 3 per-
cent of GDP. 
Adjusted Measures of NIPA Saving
For the reasons noted above, the raw NIPA data are suspect, and it
would be useful to know whether the issues raised earlier affect assess-
ments of trends either in total investment over time or in the allocation of
saving across sectors. In this section, therefore, we adjust the NIPA data
for several factors.
To incorporate saving and investment in the form of durable goods, we
use data on net investment in durables taken from the FFAs. Net invest-
ment is measured as the change in the stock of durables and equals new
purchases less the estimated depreciation of the existing stock of
durables.
11
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11. For further discussion see Auerbach (1985), Congressional Budget Office (1993),
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.To provide consistent treatment of government and private pensions, we
treat government pensions as if they were private pensions. That is, we add
contributions and interest earnings to personal saving and exclude beneﬁt
payments from personal income.
12
To measure each sector’s NIPA saving in real terms, we subtract from
each sector’s nominal saving the product of the percentage change in the
GDP deﬂator and the beginning-of-period credit market debt.
13 Credit mar-
ket debt, for the household sector, includes debt held by pension funds.
We use the GDP deﬂator to obtain as broad a measure of inﬂation as pos-
sible. However, using the personal consumption expenditure deﬂator would
not change our conclusions signiﬁcantly. We do not adjust equity holdings
for inﬂation, because the NIPA framework does not include capital gains.
To account for the accrual of tax payments implicit in pension saving,
we multiply pension fund saving by an assumed effective tax rate of 20
percent.
14 We do not claim that this is exactly the correct effective tax rate
to employ. Rather, our goal here is to see whether plausible adjustments for
tax accruals have significant effects on the evolution or the composition
of saving. For simplicity’s sake we attribute the entire accruing tax bill to
the federal government rather than allocate it across federal, state, and
local governments.
The adjusted data in table 2 show the same general trends in the level of
national saving as do the raw NIPA data. Both series show net domestic
investment rising in the 1990s but remaining below levels attained in the
1960s and 1970s. Because the share of foreign saving ﬁnanced by foreign
investment rose by 2 to 3 percent of GDP over the same period, adjusted
net domestic investment financed by domestic saving fell from 12.3 per-
cent of GDP in the 1960s to 8.1 percent in 1998.
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12. Formally, we use the ﬂow of funds measure of government pension fund “net acqui-
sitions.” As discussed below, the flow of funds approach measures the same concept as do
the NIPAs but uses different data and thus differs slightly empirically. Bosworth, Burtless,
and Sabelhaus (1991) and Hendershott and Peek (1989) make similar adjustments. Others
have decided it is more meaningful to treat accumulations by firms to pay future pension
benefits as business saving, and they allocate the saving in defined benefit plans to the
business sector to be consistent with the way that the NIPAs allocate saving in government
pension plans to the government sector. See, for example, Summers and Carroll (1987)
and Poterba (1987). 
13. Similar adjustments for inflation have been made by Summers and Carroll (1987),
Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (1993), Hendershott and Peek (1989), and Wilcox (1991).
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Taken together, the adjustments significantly alter the composition of
the saving decline. For example, the adjusted personal and total private
saving rates have fallen by less than the official NIPA measures suggest,
both in the recent past and in the long run. Whereas NIPA personal sav-
ing fell by 3.1 percent of GDP in the 1990s, adjusted personal saving fell
by only 0.8 percent of GDP. Relative to its levels in the 1970s and 1980s,
NIPA personal saving in 1998 had fallen by almost 5 percent of GDP, and
NIPA private saving by almost 4 percent of GDP. Adjusted private sav-
ing, however, fell by only about 2 percent of GDP.
Taken individually, the adjustments have a wide variety of effects.
Investment in consumer durables was 2.3 percent of GDP in 1998 and
increased by about 1 percent of GDP over the decade. We attribute this
increase to the normal cyclical nature of durables investment. Adding
investment in durables to NIPA net private domestic investment does not
change long-run investment trends very much, however, because the frac-
tion of GDP devoted to increasing the stock of durables in 1998 was close
to its historical average.
Accumulation in government retirement accounts and trust funds is
substantial, rising from about 1 percent of GDP in the 1960s to 1.7 percent
in 1998. Shifting these funds from government to the personal sector alters
saving levels in both sectors but does not change conclusions about the
recent drop in personal saving, because government pension saving has
been stable or even falling in the last decade. Adjusting for the accrual of
taxes reduces personal saving by about 1 percent of GDP for the last thirty
years but has not signiﬁcantly altered the trend.
The inflation adjustment has a significant impact on reported saving
rates. It reduces net saving of the two creditor sectors (households and for-
eigners) and raises net saving of the two borrowing sectors (government
and corporations). The effect varies significantly over time because of
changes in the underlying inflation rate. Much of the decline in nominal
personal saving can be attributed to the decline in inflation. From the
1970s to 1995, the nominal personal saving rate fell by 3 percent of GDP,
but disinﬂation accounts for ﬁve-sixths of that decline. Between 1995 and
1998, the nominal personal saving rate fell by 2.3 percent of GDP, of
which the reduction in inflation accounts for roughly 40 percent. Since the
net inflation adjustment across sectors is zero, however, the inflation
adjustments shift government and corporate saving in exactly the oppo-
site direction.
194 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1999In summary, the NIPA adjustments made above raise the level of sav-
ing, reinforce the notion that saving has declined, and change somewhat
the attribution of the source of the decline. In particular, official NIPA per-
sonal and private saving figures show larger declines than the adjusted
measures do.
Saving in the Flow of Funds Accounts
Our second perspective on saving uses data on household balance
sheets to examine how the composition of private and household saving
has changed over time. We use the measure of household sector saving in
the Federal Reserve Board’s flow of funds accounts.
15 The FFAs measure
the value of wealth holdings and debt at discrete points in time and the
active acquisition and disposition of assets and liabilities. The change in
levels between discrete points in time is the sum of net acquisitions and
revaluations. The FFA measure of saving is just the net acquisitions com-
ponent of the change in the wealth—like the standard NIPA measure, the
standard FFA measure of saving does not include capital gains.
The FFA measure of personal saving is intended to represent the same
concept as the NIPA measure, except that accumulations in government
pensions and net investment in consumer durables are attributed to house-
hold saving. In practical terms, however, the NIPAs and the FFAs use dif-
ferent data sources and different approaches to measuring saving, and
these differences create statistical as well as conceptual discrepancies
between the series. The statistical differences are generally less than 1 per-
cent of income in absolute value.
Our results for the FFA saving rate are not strictly comparable to the
NIPA saving rate measures reported above, nor are they intended to be.
Our analysis of NIPA saving focused on how various adjustments altered
the allocation of saving across sectors, and such an analysis requires a
denominator (GDP) that includes all sectors. In contrast, our analysis of
the FFA data focuses on the composition of private saving. Thus we use a
measure of private sector net resources as the denominator for the FFA
saving rates. The income measure—which we call expanded disposable
income—is the sum of NIPA disposable income, net investment in gov-
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15. See Wilson and others (1989) for a detailed description of the FFA data.ernment pensions, and corporate retained earnings, less the implied tax
accruals on pensions. 
Table 3 shows our estimates of aggregate, FFA-based saving rates.
These rates reﬂect the decline in saving found in the NIPA data. FFA pri-
vate saving fell from an average of about 15 percent of expanded dispos-
able income in the 1980s to 9 or 10 percent in 1996–98. The equivalent
measure of household saving, shown in the third line, fell from 12.2 per-
cent of expanded disposable income in the 1980s to an average of under
5 percent in 1996–98.
16
Gross Saving and Borrowing
Table 3 decomposes net saving into gross saving and gross borrowing
and their components, in order to examine several portfolio issues.
17 The
main finding is that the long-run decline in FFA saving is largely associ-
ated with a reduction in gross saving and, within gross saving, the net
acquisition of ﬁnancial assets. Acquisition of such assets, net of tax accru-
als implicit in pension saving, fell from about 13 percent of GDP in the
1980s to 6 percent in 1996–98.
The quantitative importance of borrowing in recent saving trends
depends on the time frame chosen. Over the course of the 1990s, the rise
in private borrowing accounts for more than 100 percent of the decline in
private saving. But comparing recent years with earlier decades suggests
little change in borrowing rates. Borrowing rates in 1995–97 were some-
what lower than in the 1970s and 1980s, and the borrowing rate in 1998
was only about 1 percent of GDP higher. Even the 1998 value, however,
may not suggest an important upsurge in borrowing. Borrowing tends to be
procyclical, and the long economic expansion may be one factor driving
up borrowing recently. Moreover, the 1998 data are preliminary and sub-
ject to revision.
Table 3 also provides information on borrowing relative to household
investment in the tangible assets for which people seem most likely to take
196 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1999
16. For comparison purposes, the table also reports the standard FFA household saving
rate, which uses NIPA disposable income as the denominator, in the last memorandum
line. Our constructed household saving measure is slightly lower than the FFA household
saving measure in all periods.
17. We do not provide a measure of gross corporate borrowing, because the corporate
sector in the FFAs is not fully separated from other businesses. Whereas nonﬁnancial busi-












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.out loans. The household sector has a long history of borrowing against
its physical capital. Investment in housing less mortgage debt has been
negative during the last thirty years, including during the inﬂationary years
of the 1970s when real estate boomed. However, the interpretation of this
variable changes after 1986, because the Tax Reform Act of 1986 elimi-
nated the deductibility of nonmortgage interest and encouraged a shift
toward mortgage debt.
18 Examining household investment in durables
and housing, however, reveals roughly the same trend: borrowing
exceeded tangible investment throughout the late 1990s, but the rates
(except in 1998) are not substantially different from previous time periods.
Thus the data do not suggest that increased borrowing against housing and
other tangible wealth has led to a decline in saving. But interpretations
should be cautious: in the 1970s real house prices rose rapidly, whereas
in the 1980s and 1990s this appreciation has slowed.
19
Saving in Retirement and Nonretirement Accounts
Our second balance-sheet saving decomposition, shown in table 4,
focuses on the distinction between qualified retirement saving vehicles—
such as pensions, 401(k)s, IRAs, and Keoghs—and other saving.
20 Pension
saving is measured explicitly in the FFAs, and we use data from a variety
of sources to estimate IRA saving (as discussed in appendix A).
Whereas table 3 indicated that a decline in net acquisitions of ﬁnancial
assets accounts for the decline in saving, table 4 suggests that the source
can be pinpointed even more closely: almost all of the decline occurred
in saving outside of qualified retirement vehicles. For example, personal
saving fell by almost 7 percent of expanded disposable income from the
average of the 1970–79 and 1980–89 periods, as did households’ net
acquisition of nonretirement financial assets. In contrast, saving in retire-
ment vehicles was roughly the same in 1998 as its average in the 1970s and
1980s, gross borrowing rose by 1 percent of expanded disposable income,
and corporate retained earnings rose somewhat.
Within retirement saving, private and government pensions have main-
tained relatively constant shares of GDP over the last thirty years. Nor
198 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1999
18. Maki (1995).
19. Steuerle (1990) examines similar issues from an earlier vantage point.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.has IRA saving fallen, even though restrictions on the deductibility of IRA
contributions after 1986 severely curtailed new contributions. The strength
of IRA saving in the late 1980s and 1990s is attributable to a high rate of
rollovers from pensions to IRAs, which underscores the importance of
examining all retirement saving vehicles simultaneously.
21
Capital Gains
The FFA analysis, like the NIPA results, shows that plausible adjust-
ments and decompositions of measured saving rates can generate new
insights on saving behavior. However, none of the estimates above include
capital gains. Given the massive runup in stock market values in recent
years, the magnitude and interpretation of such gains are important fea-
tures of wealth accumulation. Our third perspective therefore incorpo-
rates capital gains into saving rate measures.
Sources of Changes in Wealth
Table 5 compares the magnitude of capital gains and measured FFA
saving over the past forty years. The calculations use the same denomina-
tor, expanded disposable income, as in tables 3 and 4. Thus the household
sector net saving rate in table 5 excludes capital gains and is the same as
the value in the third line of table 3.
Table 5 demonstrates several key points. First, capital gains have dom-
inated measured saving as a source of wealth change in the last forty years,
except during the 1960s and 1990–94. Even in those periods, however,
capital gains were as large as measured saving.
Second, the overall rate of capital gains since 1995 is large relative to
earlier years and will prove even larger when the decline in inflation is
taken into consideration below. Since 1995, capital gains have accounted
for over 80 percent of the gains in household sector net worth. In 1997
and 1998, capital gains were approximately ten times measured saving.
Third, the composition of capital gains has changed over time. In the
1970s and 1980s, tangible capital accounted for about half of all capital
gains. In the 1990s, however, ﬁnancial assets have accounted for almost all
200 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1999




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.of the gains. Capital gains on pension assets alone have equaled about 10
percent of income over the past four years.
It is important to note that our measure of aggregate capital gains does
not—and need not—conform closely to changes in aggregate stock market
indices over the relevant periods. For example, whereas the S&P 500 rose
by 70 percent between 1959 and 1969, by only 5 percent between 1969
and 1979, and by 213 percent between 1979 and 1989,
22 our measure
reports capital gains of roughly the same percentage of expanded dispos-
able income in all three decades. The main source of the difference is that
our measure includes capital gains not only on publicly held corpora-
tions—which are captured in stock market returns—but also on privately
held corporations and on noncorporate business assets. For these entities,
the change in their value in the FFAs is calculated by adjusting estimates
of the land and physical capital they own by prices of land and physical
capital. These differences are examined in detail in appendix B.
Figure 1 plots the data in table 5 on an annual basis. The data show sub-
stantial year-to-year variation in capital gains. In the past, large accruals of
capital gains, such as have occurred in recent years, have proved to be a
temporary phenomenon.
Gains-Inclusive Saving Rates
To examine saving rates that include capital gains in an internally con-
sistent manner, we add capital gains to both the numerator and the denom-
inator of the FFA saving rate used in tables 3 and 4. (Equivalently, we
add capital gains to the denominator of the values reported in the top line
of table 5, which already includes capital gains in the numerator.) This
makes the numerator equal to the change in household sector net worth
and the denominator equal to expanded disposable income plus capital
gains. We refer to this income measure as gains-inclusive income.
The top line of table 6 reports the change in household sector net worth
as a percentage of gains-inclusive income; the results differ from the rates
of wealth change in table 5 only in that capital gains are now included in
the denominator. The saving rates in table 6 are noticeably lower than the
values in table 5, because including capital gains raises the denominator
significantly, especially in recent years. Nevertheless, the late 1990s still
stand out as a period of very rapid wealth growth. The gains-inclusive
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22. Economic Report of the President, 1999, table B-95.saving rate has averaged around 35 percent since 1995. This greatly
exceeds the rates attained in the 1960s and the early 1990s and is approx-
imately the same as those in the 1970s and 1980s.
Because these results are in nominal terms, we compute a measure of
real gains equal to nominal gains less the product of the inflation rate (as
measured by the GDP deflator) and beginning-of-period net worth. We
then calculate the real gains-inclusive saving rate with real instead of nom-
inal gains in both the numerator and the denominator. 
Because of the sharp drop in inﬂation since the late 1970s, adjusting for
inflation dramatically changes the results. The increase in household net
worth falls by 20 percent of gains-inclusive income in the 1970s, from 33
percent to 13 percent. In the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990–94, the annual
increase in household net worth falls by about 10 percent of gains-
inclusive income. In contrast, the inflation adjustment for the late 1990s
is small. Thus real gains-inclusive saving rates in the late 1990s are higher
than at any point in the past forty years, and the inclusion of capital gains
in a saving rate measure greatly ampliﬁes the impact of correcting reported
saving rates for inﬂation. 
The inclusion of capital gains highlights the fact that part of the mea-
sured increase in household sector wealth is an accrued tax liability of
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Figure 1. Sources of Change in Household Sector Net Worth, 1960–98
a
Percent of expanded disposable income
1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 19961998
Capital gains
Household sector net saving
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Federal Reserve Board World Wide Web sites and authors’calculations.
a. Both series are adjusted for accrued tax liabilities on retirement account saving and unrealized capital gains. Expanded dis-






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.that sector, because taxes may be due on capital gains when they are real-
ized. In the analysis in tables 1 through 4 we adjusted pension saving
(defined to exclude capital gains) for tax accruals, using 20 percent as an
estimated tax rate. Here we continue to adjust traditionally measured pen-
sion saving by 20 percent, but we also adjust accrued capital gains on
pensions by 20 percent and accrued capital gains on taxable assets by 10
percent (the latter to reﬂect accepted rules of thumb in public ﬁnance). As
before, we do not present these as precise estimates; our goal is rather to
determine whether accounting for tax accrual significantly affects the
trends in the data.
We adjust both the numerator and the denominator of the saving rate
calculations for tax accruals. The results in the third line of table 6 show
that, before adjusting for inflation, the tax accrual adjustment averages
about 1 percent of gains-inclusive income in the 1960s and 1970s, rising to
about 2.5 percent in the 1990s.
When both the inﬂation and tax accrual adjustments are applied in table
6, the effect of the latter on the time path of estimated wealth accumulation
rates is slightly amplified. The accrued tax effect is fairly small in the
1960s and 1970s, lowering the rate of wealth accumulation by about 1 to 2
percent of gains-inclusive income. By the late 1990s, when pensions and
capital gains are booming, the adjustment is about 3 percent of gains-
inclusive income.
Figure 2 shows gains-inclusive saving rates on an annual basis. The
ﬁgure reﬂects the large year-to-year variation in capital gains shown in ﬁg-
ure 1, but it also clearly shows the joint effects of adjusting for inflation
and tax accruals. The adjusted ﬁgures for household wealth accumulation
are larger, relative to gains-inclusive income, than at any time in the past
forty years.
Interestingly, the adjustment for tax accruals has a signiﬁcant impact on
the time path of the federal budget surplus, measured as a proportion of
GDP.
23Accruing tax liabilities have been approximately 4 percent of GDP
in recent years. Much of this is due to retirement accounts. Accrued lia-
bilities on pensions and IRAs alone have risen by $2 trillion since 1980
(because pension and IRA balances have grown by $10 trillion); this is
about half the size of the outstanding federal debt. Adjustments for tax
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23. The equivalent denominator adjustment for the federal government would be to add
accrued tax liabilities to GDP when computing the government saving rate.accruals, however, do not change the overall long-term fiscal stance of
the federal government. That is, attributing the tax accruals to federal
resources when the accruals occur implies that they cannot be attributed
again in the future, when the taxes are paid. Nevertheless, examining the
time path of tax accruals suggests that ﬁscal policy has not been as proﬂi-
gate as it may have ﬁrst appeared in the 1980s and early 1990s. It also sug-
gests that a significant portion of future revenues are attributable to real-
ized capital gains, pension withdrawals, and other deferred incomes that
represent repayment of tax loans made by the government.
Should Capital Gains Be Included in Measures of Saving?
The results above show that interpretations of recent saving behavior
hinge crucially on whether capital gains are included as saving. Here we
discuss some of the major arguments for and against including capital
gains as saving.
24
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Figure 2. Gains-Inclusive Saving Rates, 1960–98
Percent of gains-inclusive income




Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Federal Reserve Board World Wide Web sites and authors’calculations.
a. Change in household sector net worth divided by gains-inclusive income. Gains-inclusive income is NIPA disposable income
plus net investment in government retirement accounts and household sector capital gains (see ﬁrst line of table 6).
b. Inflation- and tax-adjusted saving rate starts with the nominal gains-inclusive saving rate, then subtracts inflation losses on
household sector net worth and accrued tax liability on pension accumulations and unrealized capital gains from both the numer-
ator and the denominator (see fourth line of table 6).
24. For related analyses see Auerbach (1985), Summers and Carroll (1987), Bradford
(1990, 1991), and Hendershott and Peek (1989).Whether capital gains should be included as saving depends to some
extent on the issue being examined. For example, a household preparing
for retirement should include capital gains in its measure of what its mem-
bers have saved, since capital gains can be consumed in retirement just as
easily as interest and dividend earnings.
At an aggregate level, however, the issue is more complex. Auerbach
notes that if saving is the creation of resources today in order to consume
more tomorrow, then whether capital gains should be included as saving
depends on the source of the gain.
25 If the underlying asset has become
more productive, the capital gain should be thought of as saving. However,
if it results from a shift in tastes, the capital gain has not contributed any-
thing to increasing future income or production and so should not be con-
sidered saving.
Auerbach’s analysis, which is useful for tracing out a variety of effects,
starts with a closed economy. For example, a decline in the value of a
machine due to a fall in its productivity should be counted as a decline in
saving. However, a decline in its value due to the invention of a new, bet-
ter machine should not count as a fall in saving, since there is no implied
decline in future production or consumption. 
Auerbach also provides an interesting example regarding the role of
tastes in determining capital gains, still in a closed economy. Suppose each
middle-aged generation owns land, which is fixed in quality and quantity
and is the only store of value, and sells it to the next generation to ﬁnance
its own retirement. A change in the price of land that occurs because one
generation has a different discount rate than all of the others will introduce
capital gains but no increase in future consumption. Thus, in this exam-
ple, real revaluations of assets that occur because of changes in time pref-
erence rates or risk premiums should not be reﬂected in saving. 
This implies that even if capital gains increase an individual’s or a
cohort’s wealth, they may also impose costs on other individuals or cohorts
and therefore may not increase aggregate wealth. That is, just because it
is appropriate to include capital gains in measuring the resources of an
individual or cohort does not automatically imply that it is appropriate to
include such gains in measuring aggregate saving.
26
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25. Auerbach (1985).
26. Schultze (1990) provides a related example based on the value of taxicab medallions.The implications of Auerbach’s example, however, may be different in
an open economy. Changes in the price of a domestic asset that are due to
changes in domestic tastes cannot raise future national consumption in a
closed economy. However, in an open economy, asset price changes due to
changes in domestic tastes could raise future national consumption to the
extent that the gains expand U.S. consumers’and ﬁrms’ability to purchase
goods or services from other countries. Of course, not all domestic capi-
tal gains will expand U.S. nationals’ability to command foreign resources:
there may be equivalent capital gains in other countries, the domestic cap-
ital gains may accrue to foreigners, and exchange rate adjustments would
need to be taken into account. Nevertheless, to the extent that any domes-
tic capital gain raises the country’s ability to purchase resources from other
countries, that gain should count as an addition to national saving—even if
it is due to changes in tastes and is therefore not an increase in world
saving.
That is, the role of an individual country in a world economy is much
like that of an individual or a cohort in a closed economy. In a closed econ-
omy, a capital gain due to shifts in tastes should count as saving for the
individual receiving it, even if it does not add to saving at an aggregate
level. Likewise, in an open economy, a capital gain due to shifts in tastes
should count as saving for the country receiving it—to the extent that it
raises the country’s future consumption possibilities—even if it is not an
addition to saving at the world level.
In practice, determining which capital gains fall in which category is
difficult. Bradford, for example, acknowledges that changes in discount
rates could cause changes in market values, and he notes several other
problems with using market values as indicators of saving, but he con-
cludes nevertheless that the change in market value remains a more use-
ful saving concept than NIPA measures.
27 Schultze suggests that most cap-
ital gains have little to do with increases in future production or income
and so should not be counted as saving, but he implicitly acknowledges
that capital gains that do raise future production and income should be
included as saving.
28
More recently, Glassman and Hassett argue that the recent runup in
stock prices is due in large part to the decline of the equity risk premium.
29
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27. Bradford (1990, 1991).
28. Schultze (1990).
29. Glassman and Hassett (1999).They point out that the growth of dividends or earnings per share has not
changed much in recent years relative to historical norms, but that earnings
and dividend yields have plummeted. They argue that this pattern is more
likely to be the result of changes in investors’attitudes toward risk than
of massive infusions of new (intangible) capital, because a large amount of
new capital would normally be reﬂected in current and medium-run earn-
ings forecasts, and this does not appear to be the case. In this view, the
runup in stock prices should only be considered an increase in national
saving to the extent that it has increased Americans’ability to purchase
goods and services from abroad.
Hall, however, offers an opposing view, namely, that accruing capital
gains on corporate stock can be interpreted as increases in the quantity of
capital under certain conditions—the absence of monopoly rents, scarcity
rents, and adjustment costs.
30 He presents evidence that the value of aggre-
gate corporate securities behaves over time essentially as one would expect
if the value of securities reﬂected the quantity of capital. These results sug-
gest that recent capital gains should be included in saving.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has evaluated ofﬁcial measures of the saving rate in light of
the recent decline of NIPA personal saving to effectively zero. We ﬁnd, as
do others, that official saving measures are not representative of basic eco-
nomic concepts and that various adjusted measures of saving have moved
in markedly different directions over the past two decades. 
In particular, whereas NIPA personal saving declined from about 
5 percent of GDP in the 1970s and 1980s to less than 0.5 percent in 1998,
an alternative measure that adjusts personal saving for durables, retirement
accounts, inflation, and tax accruals and integrates personal and business
saving fell only from about 9 percent of GDP in the 1970s and 1980s to 
7 percent in 1998. By this measure, which we would claim is closer to an
economic concept of saving, the decline is much smaller, and the current
level of saving much higher, than under the conventional measure. 
Adjusted FFA saving data show a similar decline. They also show that
borrowing is not significantly out of line with past years and that the vast
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30. Hall (1999).portion of the decline is concentrated in net acquisitions of nonretirement
assets.
Adding capital gains fundamentally changes recent trends. If all capi-
tal gains are included, the current adjusted household saving rate is the
highest in at least the last forty years, despite a personal saving rate of
zero. However, it remains controversial whether it is appropriate to include
capital gains in general, and the recent capital gains in particular, in saving.
Our ﬁndings suggest that, in principle, all discussions of whether saving
has risen or fallen, and by how much, need to be qualified by the concept
and measure of saving employed. In practice, this distinction appears to be
crucial when considering data over the recent past. However, as Eisner
noted in a similar exercise, “There is nothing sacrosanct about any of the
time series presented in this paper.”
31 In particular, other items could be
added to the deﬁnitions of saving or investment used in the present paper.
Intangible capital may be growing rapidly, but these expenditures are not
treated currently as saving or investment.
32 Accumulation and decumula-
tion of human capital share many of the same properties as accumulation
and decumulation of physical or financial capital.
33 The discovery and
development of natural resources clearly add to a nation’s capital stock.
34
Tangible government assets provide services and income flows just as
comparable private assets do.
35 The findings could also be extended to
examine different measures of resources available to consumers. Kot-
likoff and Bradford, for example, advocate the use of a measure that
includes net national product plus consumption of durables and govern-
ment tangible assets less government purchases of goods and services
and capital investment.
36 Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus construct
comprehensive estimates of all expected government benefits and taxes
of the household sector and examine the changes in those expected val-
ues over time.
37
We believe that the appropriate measure of saving will ultimately be a
judgment call and will depend on the question being asked. But develop-
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31. Eisner (1991).
32. Hall (1999); Blair and Kochan (1999).
33. Auerbach (1985); Eisner (1988); Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989); Rosen (1989).
34. Nordhaus (1995).
35. Boskin (1986); Eisner (1988).
36. Kotlikoff (1989); Bradford (1990).
37. Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus (1996).ing empirically comprehensive and theoretically consistent measures of
saving would clearly be helpful. It would provide saving data that corre-
spond more closely to the concept of saving employed in theoretical mod-
els. This would allow more informative tests of theory, better compar-
isons of saving over time and across countries with different institutional
patterns,
38 and greater understanding of the effects that policies that
encourage one type of saving may have on other forms of saving. These
issues are well beyond the scope of this paper but represent interesting
avenues for future research.
APPENDIX A
Estimates of IRA Saving
TO CALCULATE IRA saving and capital gains on IRAs, we use data from
the Employee Benefits Research Institute (EBRI), the American Council
of Life Insurance (ACLI), and tax returns.
39
There are two ways to construct saving measures for pensions or IRAs.
One is as the sum of employer and employee contributions, interest earn-
ings, and dividend earnings, less benefits paid—the FFA calls this “net
acquisition” of ﬁnancial assets. This net saving ﬂow is conceptually iden-
tical to the second measure, which is calculated as changes in pension fund
balances less capital gains.
We use both approaches to construct estimates of IRA saving. Using
EBRI data on IRA balances at ﬁnancial institutions, we subtract IRA bal-
ances held at life insurance companies using ACLI data, because those bal-
ances are already counted as pensions in the FFAs. We also use data on
contributions to and withdrawals from IRAs, as reported on tax returns,
and an estimate of interest and dividends paid on IRAs from unpublished
NIPA sources. We do not have direct data on rollovers from pensions to
IRAs, but we proxy those flows using the gap between gross and taxable
pension distributions as reported by taxpayers on their 1040 forms.
40
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38. Eisner (1988).
39. See Fronstin (1998) and American Council of Life Insurance (1998) for descrip-
tions of the data.
40. The rollover estimate is described in detail in Sabelhaus (1998). A direct estimate
of rollovers, based on linked form 1040 and IRA and pension information returns in Sabel-
haus and Weiner (1999), conﬁrms this approach.Given the data on IRAs from many sources, it is instructive to see how
well the flows and balances fit together. The missing link is capital gains:
we estimate these gains by applying the change in the S&P 500 to IRAs
held at brokerage institutions and mutual funds. We then compute the
IRA ﬂow discrepancy as the change in balances less estimated gains, con-
tributions, rollovers, and interest and dividend earnings, plus withdrawals.
The pieces of the puzzle fit together quite well; on a percentage basis the
discrepancy is quite small.
41 Our measure of IRA saving is then the change
in IRA balances less estimated capital gains.
APPENDIX B
Decomposition of Capital Gains 
THIS APPENDIX SHOWS how capital gains on ﬁnancial assets in the ﬂow of
funds accounts have varied across categories of assets and across time.
Changes across time do not necessarily track broad movements in stock-
price indices because of the way gains are computed and because traded
equities are only one component of total financial assets. Here we spell 
out more clearly how gains are computed in the FFAs, and we separate
gains on traded equities from other types of gains to show the relative
magnitudes.
Table B1 shows balances and sources of change in four broad categories
of ﬁnancial assets in each of the last four decades. Total ﬁnancial assets are
divided among directly held corporate equities (including mutual funds),
pension funds (which hold a mix of stocks and bonds), equity in noncor-
porate businesses, and other financial assets. Notice that even the “other”
category will include some stock holdings, because it includes, for exam-
ple, personal trusts.
Capital gains are not measured directly in the FFAs; rather, they are
residuals, which reconcile the beginning and ending balances after
accounting for the two other sources of change. The household sector
begins each period with holdings in each of the four categories and then
212 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1999
41. Sabelhaus (1998). It is important to note that all of the IRA data series end before















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.buys or sells units of assets in each category during the period. At the end
of the period there is a new stock of holdings, which equals the beginning
stock plus net purchases (or “net acquisitions” in FFA terminology) plus
capital gains (“asset revaluations” in the FFAs). Since the beginning and
ending stocks and net acquisitions are measured directly, the revaluations
estimate is the balancing item.
Thus, in each line of table B1, the third column is solved for given the
other columns, which are input directly from the FFAs. Certain types of
assets within categories are not revalued; in particular, bonds are always
measured at par value, and therefore no gains are recorded. However, there
are measured gains in all four categories because, as noted, there is some
level of equity holding in each of the four—even “other” ﬁnancial assets.
The relationship between aggregate stock market indices and overall
capital gains is clear in table B1. For example, in each of the last two
decades, gains on directly held corporate equities nearly tripled the initial
value of household sector holdings in that category, and thus the value of
these holdings grew rapidly even though households were net sellers of
equities. Pension funds also experienced gains, but the fact that equities
make up only part of their asset holdings lowered the category’s percent-
age growth. Gains were only a small part of the story for growth in other
assets.
In the 1970s, however, gains on equities were much smaller, which is
consistent with the lack of growth in aggregate stock-price indices during
that decade. On the other hand, noncorporate businesses are seen to have
reaped significant gains in the 1970s. Unlike for publicly traded equities,
no market valuation data are available for unincorporated or closely held
businesses, and therefore the FFAs revalue their assets directly. For these
entities, the change in value in the FFAs is calculated by adjusting esti-
mates of the land and physical capital they own by prices of land and phys-
ical capital. Thus, just as tangible assets such as land and housing held
directly by the household sector were revalued as inflation raged in the
1970s, so, too, were the tangible assets of noncorporate businesses.
Indeed, revaluation of noncorporate business equity accounts for almost 90
percent of the nominal revaluation of ﬁnancial assets during the 1970s.
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Discussion
Robert E. Hall: William Gale and John Sabelhaus take us on a fascinating
tour of data on U.S. financial markets, organized as a discussion of flows
of saving. I belong firmly to the school of thought that considers con-
sumption and output as fundamental variables and income and saving as
constructs derived from those fundamentals. This school is associated with
Irving Fisher, Milton Friedman, Franco Modigliani, and essentially all
modern research in general-equilibrium macroeconomics. But I will not go
nearly so far as to say that data on saving are uninformative. This paper
shows quite the opposite. Models based on fundamentals have implica-
tions for saving and income ﬂows, and data on these ﬂows can be studied
fruitfully to check ideas about the models.
The national income accounts distinguish between business and
personal saving. I agree with the authors’statement that the line between
them is “thin and somewhat arbitrary.” Their findings support adding 
the two together to arrive at private saving, which is the way I will proceed.
Of course, the view that people treat businesses as extensions of them-
selves is a close relative of the more controversial proposition that they
treat the government as an extension of themselves as well. Again, the
paper supports this proposition, but I will not collapse the government 
into the private economy. I will consider private, government, and foreign
saving.
Table 1 below summarizes the basic findings of the paper about these
saving ﬂows in the NIPA data. The table reports the authors’adjusted data,
taking account of the NIPAs’failure to state interest ﬂows correctly under
inflation, counting consumer durables accumulation as investment, and
putting all retirement programs on an equal footing. I concentrate on a
215comparison of the 1980s with 1998, the year of the extreme emergency in
personal saving.
By far the most important fact revealed in the table is the swing in gov-
ernment saving. Government—federal, state, and local—went from being
a user of saving in the aggregate to being a contributor of saving. Private
saving fell to offset this change in the government’s role in credit 
ﬂows. Almost any reasonable general-equilibrium macroeconomic model
would have predicted this offset, even if it did not imply full Ricardian
neutrality. 
The data for this period show a very modest increase in total saving.
Strict neutrality would have total saving unresponsive to changes in gov-
ernment saving, but there were other changes between the 1980s and 1998
that could account for the change.
Any reasonable model would have foreign saving move in the oppo-
site direction from government saving—this was the idea of the twin
deficits of the mid-1980s. But it did not happen in the 1990s. The trade
deﬁcit widened despite the huge swing in government saving. The unique
position of the thriving U.S. economy in a weak world economy in 1998
presumably accounts for this. Again, the big change in government sav-
ing is not the only difference between the 1980s and 1998.
At the same time that the government was moving from a user of saving
to a supplier, there was a huge increase in consumption as a fraction of
GDP over the 1980s and 1990s. It is important to note that the mechanism of
rising consumption is logically separate from the one connecting govern-
ment saving to total saving. Consumption grew as a mirror image of a huge
decline in government purchases of goods and services. The shift in the rela-
tion between disposable income and consumption is only a small part of
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Table 1. Change in Adjusted Saving Rates by Type, 1980s and 1998
Percent of GDP
Type of saving 1980s 1998 Change
Private 8.6 6.9 –1.7
Government –0.6 2.3 2.9
Foreign 1.7 2.4 0.7
Totala 9.7 11.6 1.9
Source: Gale and Sabelhaus, this volume, table 2. 
a. Sum of the components of saving as reported by the authors. It differs from their “Adjusted sources of funds for net domes-
tic investment” by the statistical discrepancy.the story of increased consumption in relation to GDP. Rather, the govern-
ment has shifted from collecting taxes to pay for goods and services to col-
lecting taxes to pay for transfers. Resources freed as a result of a huge
shrinkage in government purchases—mainly in military spending—have
been funneled into consumption. This would have happened even if there
had been no change in government saving and no change in private saving.
The paper shows that there is a lot to learn from the FFA data as well.
Table 2 below shows data extracted from tables 3 and 4 in the Gale and
Sabelhaus paper, boiled down to reveal the most interesting ﬁndings. The
top line shows households’acquisitions of physical capital: houses and
durable goods. This type of investment rose slightly from the 1980s to
1998, not surprisingly given that 1998 was an incredible boom year. The
second line shows a modest decline in net contributions to retirement
plans. The real surprise is in the third line: households became major net
sellers of nonretirement financial wealth in 1998. This is a combination
of borrowing more and selling more equity.
One factor in the huge swing in household asset transactions was
increases in housing values. As houses change hands, the purchasers take
out larger mortgages than the sellers had. As the paper shows, net mort-
gage borrowing exceeded investment in new houses in both the 1980s
and 1998. But the stock market is the centerpiece of the story of net sales
of nonretirement assets. Despite the net sales, the stock market wealth of
U.S. households rose astronomically over the period. Presumably most of
the net asset sales from households were to foreigners, either through sales
of securities to them or through borrowing from them. The principal alter-
native way that net sales could have occurred is through repurchases of
shares by corporations. 
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Table 2. Changes in Household Sector Net Saving by Type, 1980s and 1998
Percent of expanded disposable income
Type of saving 1980s 1998 Change
Investment
a 5.8 5.8 0.0
Retirement
b 5.9 4.7 –1.2
Other ﬁnancial
c 0.5 –6.1 –6.6
Total 12.2 4.4 –7.8
Source: Gale and Sabelhaus, this volume, tables 3 and 4.
a. Sum of owner-occupied housing and consumer durables. 
b. Saving in retirement vehicles by corporations and households. 
c. Calculated as a residual.The third topic explored in the paper is how and whether to bring capi-
tal gains into measures of saving and income. Again, the authors make
important adjustments to the ofﬁcial data. Table 3 compares their adjusted
data with the data without adjustment for capital gains. The authors per-
form this exercise at the level of the household, and thus they sidestep a
tricky issue that would arise if they tried to include capital gains in total
saving. The capital gain that occurs when a ﬁrm reinvests proﬁt in physical
capital is already included in NIPA saving to the extent of the capital itself.
Only the excess of the capital gain over the recorded saving of the corpo-
ration should be added to saving and income. But because household ﬂows
do not include business saving, this problem does not arise in the paper.
The table shows the startling results of adding capital gains to the sav-
ing data. Instead of a decline in household saving, 1998 records a huge
increase over the 1980s. No wonder households were shedding some of
their ﬁnancial assets—the ones they kept had grown so much in value!
The paper only hints at an analysis of whether or not capital gains
should be included. It identiﬁes two polar positions. One is associated with
Alan Auerbach, who noted that capital gains on land—an unproduced
factor of production whose value would rise with a decline in the rate of
time preference—are not income in any useful sense.
1
The Auerbach position is supported by John Campbell and Robert
Shiller.
2 Their position is that the ratio of stock prices to dividends is at
an abnormal high, consistent with the possibility that stock prices will fall.
As a result, the anticipated return could be low or even negative. In this
view it would be silly to include the capital gains of the past seventeen
years in income and saving. If capital losses should occur as a result of
the price-dividend ratio returning to normal, these would have to be
deducted from income and saving in future years, which would make the
data appear ridiculous.
The other position, associated with Martin Baily and David Bradford,
links capital gains to firms’unmeasured investments in productive assets,
such as new technology.
3 In that case, capital gains in excess of measured
business saving reveal the volume of those investments. Capital gains
could logically be added to income and saving in this case. My own recent
work, as Gale and Sabelhaus note, is sympathetic to this position.
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1. Auerbach (1985).
2. Campbell and Shiller (1998).
3. Baily (1981); Bradford (1990, 1991).The second polar position has recently been advocated forcefully 
by Greenwood and Jovanovic.
4 They report interesting evidence in 
support of the idea that information technology (IT) is the driving force
of large future increases in productivity. A basic premise of their analysis
is that an IT revolution began around 1970. Its immediate effect was to
lower the value of ﬁrms with pre-IT technology—hence the sharp drop in
the stock market in relation to GDP in the early 1970s. At that time,
according to their scenario, it became known to investors that new firms
would be created based on the new IT and that these ﬁrms would become
immensely valuable as they created new intangible capital based on that
technology.
Greenwood and Jovanovic point to the Nasdaq index as a reasonable
proxy for the value of firms using the new IT. The market value of the
typical Nasdaq ﬁrm has grown tremendously in relation to GDP, while that
of the typical ﬁrm in existence since 1968 or before has stagnated. 
In this exciting view, the United States has been accumulating capital at
a breakneck pace in recent years, as new firms build IT-based infrastruc-
ture that will result in high levels of output in future years. Their hypoth-
esis can make sense out of puzzles such as Amazon.com, a company worth
$18 billion as measured by its stock price despite revenue in 1998 of only
$610 million and operating losses of $124 million.
5
The IT revolution has not yet begun to produce the high level of output
promised by the Greenwood-Jovanovic scenario. If and when that output
does come into the market, productivity will jump. So far, however, pro-
ductivity is still on the track of slow growth that it has followed since the
early 1970s, although there are hints of a minor improvement since 1995.
William G. Gale and John Sabelhaus 219
4. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999).
5. Based on stock price quotation from Yahoo! (www.yahoo.com), June 16, 1999, and
Wall Street Journal, March 25, 1999, p. B1.
Table 3. Saving in the Flow of Funds Accounts With and Without Adjustment for
Capital Gains
Measure of saving 1980s 1998 Change
Without capital gains (percent of 
expanded disposable income) 12.2 4.4 –7.8
With capital gains (percent of 
gains-inclusive income)a 17.9 32.6 14.7
Source: Gale and Sabelhaus, this volume, tables 3 and 6.
a. After adjustment for inﬂation and accrued taxes.More than anything else, the Gale-Sabelhaus paper shows the impor-
tance for macroeconomic analysis of the phenomenal rise in the stock
market since 1982. I am confident that this paper will help draw
researchers into that important topic, which to date has not generated much
fruitful research by ﬁnancial economists. 
General discussion: William Nordhaus found the paper very informative
and important in light of the current debate on whether the United States is
undersaving and underinvesting. He noted that, in a closed economy with
perfect foresight, both Hicksian and Fisherian measures of national
income exclude capital gains or asset revaluation effects. In such a cir-
cumstance, capital gains reflect pure asset revaluation, not changes in the
resources available to the economy now or in the future. In other words,
revaluation of existing stocks is excluded when it does not reflect an
increase in either current production or sustainable consumption. On the
other hand, if there is an unanticipated increase in future productivity
growth (say, due to a cluster of innovations around the Internet), some of
the capital gains might reﬂect more optimistic estimates of future produc-
tivity. In this case, with no change in current consumption or output, there
would be no change in Hicksian saving, but Fisherian saving would
increase. Additionally, Nordhaus observed, the appropriate definition of
national saving might include asset revaluations in an open economy when
such revaluations reflect changes in the terms of trade that affect sustain-
able consumption. For example, if the economy exports oil and imports
wheat, a permanent increase in the price of oil relative to wheat increases
sustainable consumption.
Nordhaus also discussed the measurement of investment. He stressed
that current measures of investment in the NIPAs are flawed because the
concept of capital used is much too narrow. One example is the omission
of natural resources: the current NIPAs exclude the value of additions
and depletions of subsoil assets such as oil and gas. Although omitting
changes in oil and gas reserves probably does not change national invest-
ment substantially, including a broader set of environmental assets (such as
the value of clean air and water) may make a substantial difference to net
national saving. Another example of enormous signiﬁcance is the omission
in the national accounts of investment in education, human capital,
research and development, and software. Yet another example is health
capital. Nordhaus noted studies by Cutler and Richardson, Murphy and
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the last half century has been enormous because of improvements in life
expectancy. He also cited the work of Eisner, who estimates that true
national net investment is five times the measured net investment. Nord-
haus concluded that the amount of saving and investment in the United
States has been vastly underestimated. The view that we are saving noth-
ing because the personal saving rate is near zero not only is wrong but may
give a misleading impression of actual trends compared with a broader
deﬁnition of saving and investment.
Barry Bosworth reiterated that the debate over the inclusion or exclu-
sion of capital gains in income is of long standing. He agreed with Nord-
haus that the ofﬁcial measures of saving and investment are extremely nar-
row from an economist’s perspective. On the other hand, he also thought
that, although the high stock market valuations of today may be indica-
tive of future rapid productivity growth, there was room for skepticism.
In particular, it is unclear that corporations would capture a large fraction
of the payoffs to technological innovation in computers and information
technology. In his view the value of these innovations will show up as
externalities, mainly to workers and households. It seemed to him just a
matter of time before Microsoft would lose its monopoly, and he doubted
that the extraordinary valuations of Internet stocks would persist.
Benjamin Friedman observed that it was not only not surprising but
inevitable that the national saving rate inclusive of capital gains would
increase following a major appreciation of asset values. To a ﬁrst approx-
imation, total output in the short run is given, or at least certainly cannot
increase in step with the recent runup in value of the U.S. stock market. 
Net investment could be squeezed out by higher consumption, but net
investment is relatively small to start with. Similarly, the trade deﬁcit could
rise, as it has, but again, the magnitude of plausible trade deficits pales 
in comparison with the magnitude of recent capital gains. Hence the saving-
investment relationship implicit in including capital gains in the defini-
tion of income virtually guarantees an approximately parallel increase in
saving.
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